Robinson Family Hawaii net Worth
ROBAINSON family Hawaii net valueA Robinson v Ariyoshi, 441 F. Notes 559 (D. Haw. 1977)
SELWIN A. ROBINSON, Eleanor Robinson, Russell S. Robinson, Ruth R. LeFiell, Marion R. Keat, Jean R. Weir, Selwyn A. Robinson, Eleanor Robinson, Bruce B. Robinson, Trustees under the Will of Aylmer F. Robinson, Helen M. Robinson, Individuell und als Executrix, Estate of Lester B.".". Robinson, Bruce B. Robinson and Keith P. Robinson, plaintiff, by George R. ARIYOSHI, Acting Governor, George T. H. Pai, Attorney General, Andrew S. O. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Sunao Kido, Newton Miyagi, Larry E. Mehau, Manuel Moniz, Jr,
and Hisão Munechika, Vorsitzender und Mitglieder, Board of Land and Natural Resources, McBryde Sugar Company, Limited, Olokele Sugar Company, Limited, Ida Albarado, Helen B. H. Chu, Henry J. Chu, Chee Kung Fui Society, Lapaz Francisco, Marcellino Francisco, Albert K. Kaailau, Linda P. Kaiakapu, Ann N. United States District Court, D. Hawaii.
560 *561 J. Garner Anthony, John H. R. Plews, Anthony, Hoddick, Reinwold & O'Connor, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the plaintiff. Amemiya, Atty Gen., Andrew S. O. Lee, Deputy Atty Gen., State of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Pros. J. Russell Cades, Robert B. Bunn, Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the accused McBryde Sugar Co.
Acquaintance of William F. Quinn, Goodsill, Anderson & Quinn, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the accused Olokele Sugar Co. Robert B. Bunn, Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, Honolulu, Hawaii, Clinton I. Shiraishi, Shiraishi & Yamada, Lihue, Kauai, Hawaii, for small businesses. In short, the nominee claimants, the Robinson family (hereinafter referred to as the Robinson family), ask this court:
For a pronouncement that the Supreme Court's ruling in McBryde I is null and ineffective in so far as (a) it recognises the ordinary excess waters of the river as the State' possession, except for the corresponding waters legislation (a requirement that the State has never made);
b ) it decided that the old watermark cannot be segregated from the property of the country and may only be used on the country to which it belonged; c) it decided that neither McBryde nor G&R nor any of the claimants may carry this watermark out of the divide; and d) that the British commons code of bank laws is the Hawaiian watermark management act.
McBryde Sugar Company (McBryde), Olokele Sugar Company (Olokele) and Albarado, Chu et sequ were also referred to as "defendants". Mr Olokele brought a counterclaim against McBryde, the State Officials and the Small Owners claiming that the McBryde I ruling, although not yet effectively enforced by the State Officials, raises doubts about the applicability of the rental agreement with G&R and seeks to determine its water and water permissions.
He also counterclaimed against G&R and the state officers who sought to determine their waterbodies' legal status. The claimants allege that the Supreme Court's ruling was submitted to the claimants (a) without merit and (b) in neither judicial nor material due process of law in contravention of the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Pursuant to 1331, 1343, 2201, 2283 and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this tribunal has the competent judge. The case began in 1959 like soft trade winds, with each of the plaintiff and the state holding certain permissions on and in the waterways that flow down the river in accordance with what each of the sides, and the state included, considered to be the well-agreed Aquatic Right Act under the laws and rulings of Hawaii.
MacBryde lodged his lawsuit *563 on March 4, 1959 against the state, Olokele, Small Owners, etc. in the Fifth District Court (Kauai) for the identification of the parties' associated and mandatory river irrigation laws and their right to stormwater and freshwater. Nobody, not even the state, asked about the separability of the river's right to access its watersheds from the neighbouring states along the river or about the right to carry the river's bodies of land out of its divide for use.
No questions were asked about the right of the river's governing bodies to the river's ordinary excess water (with the exception of certain entitlements to compulsory licensing rights). Each party assumed that these laws were firmly anchored in Hawaii's water laws. Nobody even touched on the possible use of the British commons laws on bank laws in the Hawaiian water.
He described the party's right to the associated drinking and drinking mineral resources, prescribed drinking mineral resources, regular excess running mineral resources and stormwater and fresh running mineral resources. In Hawaii, all factions and the Supreme Tribunal agreed as an indisputably regulated Hawaiian Act on the Protection of Aquatic Resources (1) that all ordinary excess irrigation is ahupua or iri kupono konohiki[2] from which it originated, (2) that irrigation permits are separable from waterside areas and can be transfered to any country within or outside the watersheds on which they originated, without prejudice to the irrigation privileges of others in the same bodies of acres.
McBryde, P & O and the State alone lodged an appeal, their appeal related primarily to the judge's judgements on the associated and regulatory waters rights[3] and the use of stormwater and fresh washwater. McBryde I Supreme Tribunal (a) confirmed the decision of the Tribunal on the State's related McBryde and small owners' waters laws; (b) partially confirmed and partially overturned the decision on the related McBryde law; and (c) overturned the decision on McBryde's regulatory laws.
602-5 (1),[4] and its own rule 3(b)(3),[5], the Supreme Court ruled, without notice to any of the plaintiffs nor arguments from them (a) that the State possessed all bodies of water of the river, be they normal,[6] Sturm or Fresheth, except for the associated right to banks under the British Commons General Act of Shore Policy, which was explained as a document for all running surfaces of the State;
b ) that there was no excess in any electricity in the state to which the state belonged all the running irrigation system; and c) that neither G&R nor McBryde had the right to diversion of their associated river bodies outside its septum. "This ruling is in no way related to the judgement challenged by * * * * and is not within the matters brought and *564 before the District Tribunal or within the matters brought and brought before that Judge.
" This is McBryde I, 54 Haw. at 201, 504 P.2d at 1346. McBryde I's justification for this totally revolutionsary stock was based entirely on (1) a certain part of the principles adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles in their Adjudication of Claims Presented to Them, adopted by the Land Commission on August 20, 1846 and by decision of the Legislative Council on October 26, 1846, RLH 1925, Vol. II, 2124, 2128 (originally adopted as L.1847),
for 81, 85) which proclaimed that the Mahle would promote and even impose the King's authority to "promote the usufructability of property for the benefit of the public", id. 7, around 202, and currently in HRS 7-1, which the tribunal kept, encoded the tenet of Ripaarianism as it was in Massachusetts and England in the mid-nineteenth centuries, and that under this tenet purchased property under the property of plots of land along the bench (Ripa) of a brook or riverbank were confined to these plots and could not be assigned.
At the time when all political groups (with the exception of the State), comprising the non-suing small shareholders and Olokele, requested a reopening, the Tribunal allowed G&R, McBryde and the small shareholders to deal with only two questions: HRS 7-1, which came into force for the first time on August 6, 1850 and has been in our codes since then, reads: "The population also has a right to potable and flowing waters and the right of way.
Wells, flowing waters and streets are free for all, on all land that is provided as a single charge, provided this does not apply to wells and streams that have been used by individual persons for their own use. "In this case, is the above law essential for determining the parties' right to access it?
In this lawsuit, the plaintiffs brought proof, as the protocol shows, to show that properties in the Hanapepe Valley were eligible for the appropriate waters privileges for the rearing of T ara. It was found that certain plots were eligible for the corresponding permits.
What are the principles or legal theories according to which the proprietors are authorised to grant the associated right to access the plots other than those on which the courts have established the right? MacBryde II, 55 haw. at 268, 517 p.2d at 30. Though those political groups claimed makeup reasons for redirection of McBryde I in their appeals for rehearsing, the plurality (three justices) in McBryde II declined to consider the same, and in summary and most concisely, in a thoroughly indifferent pro-quisite view:
An examination of the agencies quoted in Comment 7, super, shows that before McBryde I before Capt. Cook Hawaiian waters had been carried from his catchment areas; that Kamehameha himself, before he had captured the island, had similarly rerouted waters in his home country Kohala;
that, when the judges of the Supreme Court of the Kingdom dominated the English and the judges were intimately acquainted with the incidents and priniciples that gave rise to the Great Mahele, these judges also declared as it appeared in Peck V. Irrigation attracted the interest of the tillers on these islets early on, not only because it was a need on most of the country, but also because of the fact that[taro rearing] * * * * * * called for running waters, and therefore the traveller will see references to old waterways * * * in all parts of these isles.
Watercourses [in the ahupua, which is embroiled in the fall] have been in existence since times long forgotten and were undoubtedly built by order of an old monarch, and when the deceased king[Kamehameha III] transferred these estates to the owners[according to the principle of the Great Mahele], the watercourses' full exploitation as ancillaries.
Whilst the king possessed this Ahupuaa, he had the right to transfer the waters to the country he liked, but after the watercourses were made, * * * * * his transfer of lands adjacent to the Wailuku will imply the transfer of the waters in this stream, which had not previously been allowed.
and it doesn't seem * * * * * * * that it has any normative right to watering * * * *. It is clear that the legislation regulating the use of groundwater would be slightly different in the tropics than in the north.
A hundred six years after Peck, the Supreme Tribunal rejected the Supreme Judge Allen's findings as "dicta", and the Tribunal itself committed itself to "review the Great Mahele and the statutes that they implemented". This is McBryde I, 54 Haw. At 184, 504 P.2d at 1337. Then the tribunal found that (a) the king had not transferred "his sovereignty as chief of the nation", one of which was the prerogative: "3.
In order to promote and even assert the usability of soil for the public good" and (b) the tribunal "believes[d] that the right to access waters is one of the most important usufructuary rights of land", therefore "the right to waters was explicitly and definitively reserved to the Hawaiian population for their public good in all allocations of it.
Thus, the tribunal "spat out the sacrifice for grilling",[8] and found that neither McBryde nor G&R possessed the river's waters; the state possessed it! However, the farm was not yet finished with its gastronomic creation. He noted that, although "associated right to drink waters on tarot country, which was bound to the country when the heading was confirmed", however, under the mahlele, he did so,
because" *566 use of the term `appurtenant' (Webster's Dictionary citing) * * * * * * * * Hydrological laws which[are] * * * * * attached to the particular property transferred by the initial permit * * * * * * * * the right to use water[so] purchased * * * * * * * may only be used on the] * * * * particular property to which the right belongs, and all stipulations to the contrary in our case right are invalidated.
"So neither McBryde nor Robinson & Robinson are allowed to carry watersheds * * * *. It then drew a piece of dikta from the now on fire territory of v. xay ( "Gay II"), 7, 31 Haw. for 395: "Water for household use * * * * * * * is in any case insured under the laws of Hawaii", ruled that "the right to household use * * * * * * * * * is the right enshrined in the "Adoption of further principles" issued by the Government of Hawaii on 6 August 1850, namely "The Nation * * * ** also has a right to potable and flowing waters and the right of way".
" Afterwards, the tribunal insulted the boiling plaintiffs: "Floating water" must mean that flows in brooks and creeks. It is our belief that the right to "running water" * * * * * * * a landowner is guaranteed the same river flows * * * * as at the moment of the mahelian, without any significant impairment", i.e. "in the shape and dimension given to him by design.
" I McBryde, 54 Haw. at 191-93, 504 P.2d at 1342. Then the next tribunal concluded that because many of the Massachusetts based Missions had come and brought with them the laws of that state, based on the British commonly accepted laws, i.e. the laws enshrined in the Further Principles, super, "were * * * ** a decree of the Shore Right Doctrine", as interpreted under Massachusetts and the United States!
Then, and with it, the tribunal gave McBryde, G&R and the little owners the right to redirect irrigation onto their pavement, then give it back to the river and then observe and admire the view of the irrigation that flows down into the ocean. McBryde's claim to possible prescription laws in wastewater has also been summary eliminated: Since the state holds all the wastewater, no prescription laws or disadvantageous usage laws can be asserted against the state.
Paying tribute to the doctrine of the judiciary and star rythicata, the tribunal found that "the reign of Terr. v. Gay * * * * is obligatory for the State in this case. But G&R's demands for "normal excess daytime water" and "storm and fresh water" also went in the same direction.
Given that both the state and McBryde had land under G&R along the river and everyone had the right to let the river run "in the form and magnitude given to him by nature", and this amount had never been established, "so there can be no * * * * `normal excess everyday water,' and gays & dogs.
In the way in which the tribunal has written the majoritarian view in McBryde I, it was evident that the tribunal, without notifying a third part of its intention, found that it would fully reorganize what was generally regarded as the well-agreed Hawaiian waterbodies.
In its ruling, the tribunal ruled that all running bodies of brooks in the state should be fully owned by the state, provided that they are used in accordance with the British commons laws on bank privileges. In the knowledge that this contradicts the recognized Hawaiian Act on Hydrological Legislation, the Tribunal first stated *567 that the starry decisi regime was not applicable to the Act on Hydrological Legislation.
This is the legal precedent applied by the Tribunal to the overthrow of the whole series of cases and powers listed in the following paragraphs: 7. namely Hallock vs. 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. In 604 (1940), as pointed out by Justice Marumoto in McBryde I, was not valid justification on the facts for the outcome that the courthouse had ruled it was going to attain.
Hevevering did not affect land or irrigation, nor did it lead to a violation of the laws that had been agreed upon and to an almost total disturbance of the state' s traditional agriculture system. "However, Starry Décis is a political rule and not a mechanic equation of compliance with the latest decision[here is as far as McBryde wanted to cite, and so stopped], as new and dubious, if such compliance entails colliding with a previous doctrine more comprehensive in its field of application, in itself more solid, and reviewed by empiric.
" This is McBryde I, 54 Haw. at 180, 504 P.2d at 1335. McBryde I's rejection of the document was due to the fact that it had been legally and indeed for more than a hundred and a half centuries within its area of application and was perceived as more solid by the Hawaiian monarchs, lawyers, lawmakers and business people and confirmed by real experiences with the results of the documenta.
How flimsy the argumentation of the overwhelming majority for such a fall is is shown by the way in which she stated that "the right to access it was specifically and definitely reserved for the Hawaiian public good". It was the task of the Provincial Commission to examine and transfer all rights to ownership of Hawaiian lands, and in 1846 the Commission adopted certain policies that were endorsed by the legislator, provided that "all rights to real estate * * * * are examined in accordance with these policies and subsequently certified or overruled.
As the third privilege "to promote and even assert the usability of land for the public good" and the right to drink is an important custom, "to promote the usability of land and * * * * * * to enforce" means that the king reserved all the waters for the kingdom; the holders of Almupuaas and Illis Coupono did not acquire a legitimate interest in the currents in their land.
Should the logics of the tribunal persist, only with the adoption of further principles (later 577 in 1925 ) three years later did the landowners acquire any right to irrigation/sewage. This law, as interpreted by the 1976 legal majoritarian law, means that for the first in three years landowners had the right to drink potable and flowing waters and the right of way.
Noting that the adoption of further principles "made it clear that the law is reserved for landowners the right to both potable and flowing water", nos. 192, 504 P.2d, 1342, the tribunal has circumvented the fact that the section should never be applicable to the general or landowners' right!
It is clearer from the title of the section that it should refer to "building material, plumbing, etc."; title of the landlord under tenant use. Sources of the waters, flowing waters, * * * * are free for all[hoaainas], on all countries simply given in the charge. 568 The law obviously only covered tenants' claims against their former landlord and Justice Robertson, in Oni v. Meek, 2 acres.
However, the tribunal jumped fully over this apparent fact and the old bill and came to the conclusion that these simplifying words had grafted the British commons laws on bank laws into the laws of Hawaii. Obviously, the courthouse had ignored the testimony of Justice Robertson in Kake v. C. S. Horton, 2 ahaw.
One of the defendant's lawyers argues that the United Kingdom has the application of the Commons of England and that the claim cannot therefore be upheld before that court. Although, as indicated above, the British commons laws of bank laws had never been enforced by any of the political groups, not even the state, the Supreme Court overturned the statement of Supreme Judge Perry in Gay II, super, 31 Haw. by 395:
Household irrigation on a lower ahupua is guaranteed in any case under the laws of Hawaii. Each part of the country, large or small, ahupua, ilia, or koleana, where humans lived, was under the old system of Hawaii, the storage of which, in my view, had unrestricted rights to drink potable waters for its inhabitants and for their livestock and to waters for other household use.
This was never disavowed at any point in Hawaii's legal record. After that, the judge asked himself rhetorically: "Well, what is this Hwaiian act or the old Hwaiian system cited in the ruling? "McBryde I, 54 Haw. at 191, 504 P.2d at 1341. Coming up next, the courthouse, defending itself:
The concept of "running water" must mean that it flows in naturally occurring waterways such as brooks and creeks. It is our belief that the right to "running water" included therein ensures a landowner the same amount of runoff in a brook or brook as at the moment of the mahelian, without any significant impairment, or the right to run a brook in the shape and volume given to him by man.
Eventually, the tribunal found that such a "law" was passed because the evangelists, "many of whom came from Massachusetts, * * * * * Bringed along the British commonly accepted in Massachusetts. It then proceeded with the analysis of Massachusetts and British water laws and came to the conclusion:
Against the backdrop of the Hawaiian Kingdom's past and present past, the provisions of the Act passed on August 6, 1850, reserving the "right to drink and run water" to its proprietors, were a consolidation or legal adoption of the Shore Right Code, which was recognised by the English and Massachusetts Courts as part of the Collective Acts.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's conclusive supposition that it was the Missionaries who engraved the Massachusetts Joint Act *569 in Hawaiian, it was John Ricord,[9] Hawaii's first advocate general, who, after being named Prosecutor General in 1844, designed the three organic laws of 1845-47, i.e. to (1) organise the executive ministry, (2) the executive departments and (3) the judicial department.
Hawaii's second attorney was William L. Lee[10], who was named chairman of the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles in August 1847 and to the Privy Council a fortnight later, in September 1847. He was the one who provided the Secret Council with detailed plans for the real distribution of the land in the Mahele.
Allen became Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1857. As a result, the 1976 Supreme Court could not disparage with integrity the testimony of Chief Justice Allen on the old water legislation of Hawaii as dict. In 1862, Chief Justice Allen was far more acquainted with the principles and rites, practice and statutes of the Kingdom of Hawaii than the judges of the Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii over 100 years later.
The text of the Staff Regulations invoked by the Supreme Court states that neither Ricord nor Lee nor Allen directly applied the Massachusetts Code of Conduct in the preparation of the Kingdom's first covenants. And, as his view in Peck, super, shows, Allen's choice was based on Hawaiian practice and mores not only on British commons la.
So the Supreme Court summed up its decision: Like between the state and McBryde, and McBryde and Gay & Robinson, the state is the proprietor of the waters that flow into the Koula Stream and Hanapepe *570 River. The state, McBryde and Gay & Robinson have both the corresponding and the bank privileges to waterside properties in the Hanapepe Valley.
But neither McBryde nor Gay & Robinson are allowed to carry watershed watersheds under these rights.3 According to the shore right theory, owner of plots of property adjacent to a course of rivers have the right to a brook or creek in the form and dimension determined by man.
McBryde has no proper right to access the state' s own supply of fresh and stormy waters, as no one is entitled to ownership.5 "Stormwater and fresh water" is the state' s own right. No McBryde, Gay & Robinson have the right to transfer waters from the Koula Stream and Hanapepe River from the Hanapepe Valley to other catchment areas.
"The" right to water", which was privately purchased, marketed and rented free and was taxed and condemned, was practically forfeited. The G&R and Olokele, who had spent nearly $1 million to build an enormous system to transport irrigated waters to their land, found that their system had become useless and much of their reed land had become meadow.
He was supposed to have the same destiny. A thousand hectares of cereals and other farmland on almost every larger isle would be subjected to the same tragedy, even if the landowners were not involved in the lawsuit. All watercourses of the state were purchased by the state free of cost, without prejudice to the bank owners' right under the commons laws on bank privileges.
At the hearing, as already mentioned, the Supreme Tribunal did not take into account the applicants' challenges to the unconstitutionality of its ruling, even though this was mentioned in the plaintiffs' statements on their request for a hearing. Constitutionalism of this ruling will now become the fundamental issue before this tribunal. Now to the case before this tribunal and on the basis of the minutes, which include all previous cases at McBryde v. Robinson, the statements of case, the presented evidences, the artefacts, the provisions, the applications for registration and the replies to the interrogations, the tribunal states: 1.
After the Supreme Court's statement in McBryde I, McBryde and G&R (Pl. Ex. S. C.-62 and S.C.-65) submitted applications for retrial in time and Olokele submitted an "application for partial leave and for the possibility to present evidence and arguments", whose first act of appeals to the Supreme Court (Pl. Ex. S.C.-59) was immediately rejected (Pl. Ex. S.C.-60).
The Supreme Court issued an order on 18 June 1973 ordering McBryde, G&R, the State and the small owners to produce written submissions limiting themselves to close questions relating to (1) the building of HRS 7-1[15] and (2) the use of associated waters on land other than that to which the right belongs (Pl. Ex. S.C.-66).
Restricting the questions ruled out a dispute or consultation on the fundamental issue of the applicability of state ownership of private surfaced wells. As none of the parties, such as Olokele, has lodged an appellation against the arbitral awards of the Tribunal to the small owners of the associated 50,050 gallon per hectare and per da.
There are no records of the verbal arguments, as the tribunal declined to have an formal rapporteur present. The applicants were not given an occasion to dispute McBryde I's ruling prohibiting the movement of their watersheds, which withheld most of theirs.
As indicated above, the view of the most people after the interrogation was one curve per curve that the tribunal "found no grounds to amend the present decision". The State has not proposed or made a claimant to pay for the assumption of its various ownership interests in the associated and prescribed waterservices.
Throughout 1927, the territory of Hawaii, the state's forerunner, instituted capital proceedings before the First Circuit Court (Oahu) against G&R, Olokele's forerunner in interest, McBryde and 133 others who claimed that the territory had a 220. Seventy-two hectares of property in the Hanapepe Valley and was eligible for about 50,000 Gallon per hectare and per diem of ashore.
She also claimed that McBryde was the proprietor of 110. 65-hectare plot of ground in the Hanapepe Valley "entitled to drink irrigated waters. "She claimed that the 133 others had access to drinking or home waters and demanded that G&R be prohibited from diversion of drinking waters, with the result that the lower landowners were deprived of theirs.
As these were Kauai waters privileges, this case was brought under the NGO non convenience framework (see Territory of Gay, 32 Haw. Submission of this appeal was a legal acknowledgement by the territory that McBryde's aquatic assets, whether old, owned or regulated, were duly used by McBryde for watering them.
As the amount of per hectare used in 1848 for tara farming was the fundamental sanction for Hwaiian right to access waters, in 1930 the territory teamed up with McBryde in a multi-year science project to replicate the old Hwaiian practices of tara farming at the Mahelian period to establish the level of abstraction that is given by period.
McBryde Courthouse has learned from the results of this experimental. While the Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Tribunal and the Ninth Appellate Tribunal recognised that Gay II only affected "normal" and day-to-day "surplus waters", it did not concern descriptive and related privileges and finally ruled on the property of such "normal" surpluses.
Trusting his own drinking system, McBryde had spent the amount of $11,863,392 as of December 31, 1972. Olokele's Robinson leasehold agreement to Olokele of 15 July 1944 (Ex. M-I-27) limited Olokele to the cultivation of Sugarcane (p. 67). Landlords negotiated to service and run the Olokele Trench and the Koula Trench and to provide 57% (p. 28) of the waters from the two interconnected trenches.
Most of G&R's sugared areas would only be used as part-time pastures without irrigated waters, as the intermittently running brooks would only supply the cows with potable drinkable waters during the wet season. If not irrigated, the land of sugars would be classified as "very bad grazing land" with an estimated value of $8 per hectare, or $4 if it is for agronomic use.
On the other hand, "Cane" countries are valued at $666 per hectare (or $333 if dedicated), which is $951. 42 per hectare as tonal value. Prior to McBryde I, the small owners were able to sold their irrigation licenses (usually to one of the three claimant plantations) to a "rule of thumb" of one hectare of irrigation for one hectare of arid country.
A few had been selling associated drinking permits and thus separated. It was McBryde I who made these disenfranchised privileges worthless and worthless. For at least a hundred years, the defendants and their forerunners, the State and its forerunner, the territory of Hawaii, have carried out a series of repeated operations recognising the right of individuals to privately own ordinary excess and the right of individuals with the right to associated, *576 prescribing and excess drinking irrigation to diversion of these bodies of aquatic life beyond the divide.
Deductibility and separability of private groundwater from the original country to which it belonged was established by the 1913 ruling of the Supreme Court in In Re Taxes, Waiahole Waters Co. 21 Haw. Hawaii's Court of Appeals ruled that an earlier Supreme Court ruling that the" diverted from real estate property no longer qualify as belonging to the real estate to which they initially belonged" was not replaced by the 1932 amendment of the 1932 ICCT.
Reconciliations 1932 2d, c. 40, § 26; HRS § 246-10); Re Tax Appeal of L. L. McCandless Trust Estate (No. 685 in the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii (1963), not reported, ex M-Fed. From the very beginning of recognizing ownership of Hawaiian land, lands have been purchased, traded, rented and otherwise treated as other proprietors.
Governments have purchased and financed proprietary surfacing waters and all sectors of the Hwaiian Governments have addressed surfacing waters in every respect and in the same way as individuals. Large trench system was designed by owner-occupiers to transport irrigated waters on each of the large Canaries.
2, p. 74-79, and are updated with some information on the quantities of superficial waters supplied in Ex-M-Fed. Building and developing these schemes has been promoted by (1) Hawaii' s Act, which establishes the possession of privately held aquatic land and the ability to transport all waters, however they may be in possession, for irrigation[26] and (2) by laws that permit the purchase of access privileges to land, whether publicly or privately, for the building of aquatic products, which have been in force since 1872.
Founded in 1920, the East Kauai Waters Company has built trenches, drifts, tunnels and other aqueducts for up to $1,000,000 to carry public utilities to irrigate and use. McBryde sells property to the state on July 27, 1962, and McBryde retains all ownership of the property, including parts of three of Hanapepe's culeanas.
Secondary McBryde country to the state subject to its own surfacing claims (pos. 26, *579 32 and 39 in ex. M-Fed. -1) were made from parts of Koloa that McBryde acquired for its own surfacing claims. The Hawaii Waters Authority (established under the terms of Act 22, S.L.1957) presented its status of Hawaii' legislation to the legislator immediately before it became a state entity.
and part 3 (water rights) says: In Hutchins, The Hawaiian System of Waters Righs, p. 121, the long acknowledgment of the separation of waters is summarised as follows: The Congress in 1910 changed Section 55 of the Organic Act of Hawaii to authorize local legislation: "condemn the use of general legal instruments to condemn properties for general use, as well as the transfer of access right to irrigated and other uses.
580 "Undertakings organised to design, stockpile, transport, disperse and transfer irrigated waters shall have the right to exert the expropriation powers provided for below. "These entities shall have the right to denounce right of way to land and ownership of trenches, passages, canals and pipelines necessary or appropriate for the building and servicing of a system for the pumping, distribution and transfer of waters for the purposes of watering, rinsing and milling.
Since 1880 at the latest, the taxation laws of the Kingdom and the successor states have recognised that separate from the country of source surfaced waters are per se subject to taxation as assets (L. 1896, c. 51, 17; L.1932, 2d, c. 40), and for taxation reasons separate taxation of irrigation waters is possible.
685, Cour d'appel en matière fiscale de l'État d'Hawaii (1963), surra ppel, RLH § 246-10(f). Each plaintiff claims that their copyrights are under 43 U.S.C. § 661. There are two fundamental reasons for the discharge, which are pushed by the applicants, namely that they have been robbed of their ownership and their hydraulic privileges and have been robbed of ownership of great monetary value, without either trial or material due process, in breach of the fourteenth amendment.
Certainly, if the state legislation had enacted a statute trying to complete what the Supreme Court in McBryde I did, the violation of the ordinary procedural provision of the Fourteenth Amendment would be apparent. It must therefore be decided at the outset whether the applicants' claims have been infringed without the tribunal having granted them due proceedings.
The Supreme Tribunal's ruling, as mentioned above and denounced by Judge Marumoto contrary to McBryde I, has led to the deprivation of the plaintiffs' ownership, access to clean drinking waters and the right to access drinking waters without any of them being able to be consulted in their defence. Not only did the State Tribunal violate its own regulations, but also national laws, ruling the case on questions that were never discussed or aired.
After that, on the almost absurd "repetition", although the applicants were pressured into the questions of due and proper procedure, the tribunal declined to allow or consider a dispute about it. Rather, the tribunal clearly invited the claimants to" show us why we were wrong" on questions and inferences spontaneously accepted by prima facie and ruled by the tribunal.
Only on that ground should the decision of the Tribunal be annulled, because if it is allowed to continue in effect and effect, the applicants have been denied ownership without ever having had a reasonable and reasonable possibility to protect themselves against their surrender to the State on a trays of gold without the State having asked for the present.
The G&R has been arguing that the joint Swiss legislation must be applicable to one's own right to access and enjoy access to the EU's own irrigation system, as these laws were established by a Swiss Supreme Administrative Tribunal in Gay II. of 2d 526 (1973), to the Swiss Confederate G&R charter edicts. There is no doubt here about the actual problem of terrestrial borders along shipping lanes, on which the above-mentioned cases have concentrated so closely.
They were granted the titles of the claimants to their shores and the waterside privileges via the kingdom, via the mahera. The United States did not acquire any post-announcement interests. Claimants have insisted that 43 U.S.C. 661[31] protect them as holders and holders of property in accordance with accepted practices, statutes and rulings of the Hawaiian judiciary.
Paragraph 661 is applicable only to "public properties" of the United States. As a result of the accession, all the countries in power in the Republic, as well as the "Crown Lands", became the possession of the United States and thus of "public lands". However, these "public properties" of the United States have never been the object of a sales or a divestiture under general Swiss federal legislation.
Sections 73, 91 and 99 of the Organic Law[32] conferred all these estates (with some of the above exceptions) on the territory of Hawaii and made them "public territories" and "the Hawaiian law on official territories * * ** remain in effect. For example, 661 never applied to the "public land" of Hawaii, nor to the plaintiffs' right to access them.
The Organic Act, sections 1, 5, 6, 7 and 10, fully enforced and enforced the Hawaiian law as it was under the Republic of Hawaii, unless it was incompatible with the Constitution and Acts of the United States or the Acts. The Admission Act[33] replaces the State' s right to the land on its own land ( 5), and all local legislation has come into effect ( 15).
According to the Mahel, the affected areas were and are privately-owned, and up to McBryde I the ownership of water surfaces undoubtedly went hand in hand with the state. The United States, the territory or the state have not restricted, let alone summarised, the right to privately owned properties, neither in the context of annexation nor in the context of statehood.
The Hawaii an Supreme Court, McBryde I and McBryde II, agreed to do so without compensation to the proprietors. The above comments show that since the beginning of Hawaii' aquatic legislation and for over 100 years thereafter, groundwater was separable from the country to which these laws applied, and surfaced irrigation was considered to be free to be transported out of its septum.
A brook's owners' right along its banks was far more than just a right to banks under British commons laws. for watering, rinsing and milling purposes, promoted and simplified the diverting and transport of waters from the catchment area. The Hawaiian government has been taxing segregated waters as such from the kingdom's day until today, or provided that waters permissions, the supply of waters and their cost are elements to be taken into account in the determination of soil use.
Plots with separate ownership interests in mineral waters, also according to McBryde II, are taxable only for the value of the soil, i.e. as without it. Hawaii's various Hawaiian authorities have bought surfacing waters from privately-owned companies, denounced privately-owned waters laws, oversubscribed and traded plots of property, with the waters laws reserved for privately-owned companies, and provided ditch and pipeline servitudes to carry waters across the state.
The conditions of the tenancy agreements for Sugarcane and other tenancy agreements, e.g. to some of the small farmers, force tenants to bring separately held surfaced waters onto public property in order to meet the tenancy agreements for the cultures to be cultivated.
Lease agreements were concluded both by the state and by the tenants of incumbent waters, as known before McBryde I and acceptable to all, also by the state.
Most of the land on Kauai, Oahu and Maui is watered, while three (formerly four) estates are watered on the Hawaiian Isle. The" irrigated" Zuckerplantagen have spent million of U.S. dollar in tunnel ing, embankments, trenches and pipes to transport watersheds.
Not the Hawaiian Act (as now enacted by McBryde I.) "with the exception of one characteristic of the Carter case that relates to fresh running waters, it is not and never was the same. 3. A river excess of excess flows beyond the amount necessary to meet the prescribed and related needs and privileges of certain lower level ahuupua and other areas of the Ahupua of Hanapepe.
Since the king was initially the exclusive proprietor of the water and land, he "could do with one or both as he pleasing. N ]o limit arbonyl ever existing or should it be to his capacity to use the excess water as he saw fit. No.
658: "If one of the estates transferred by the King or assigned by the Provincial Commission was eligible for the right to receive it, this *583 right was incorporated into the transfer as an accessory. "Each country's own owned and disengageable waters were transferrable to other countries, either with or without a permit, regardless of whether these other countries were adjacent or not (provided that no violation was caused by redirecting the right to other countries).
Since G&R, as the owner of the irlis coupono, was the owner of the brooks that originate on the aforementioned iris, they are therefore authorized to use and diversion of this irrigation at their own discretion, after "satisfying in the brooks the amount necessary to meet the needs of certain lower irrigation channels and other areas in the Hanapepe ahupua at the date of granting of the ownership right to the irrigation or to the irrigation right to theirals.
Those estates would be the estates of the state, McBryde and Small Holders. G&R, as the owner of the iris cupono, owned the regular excess of the two brooks and were able to redirect and carry over the regular excess as G&R liked. All G&R properties have a monetary value. The previous study shows that Hawaii's general approach to McBryde I. The right to associated bodies of land was well regulated and sound. The right to associated bodies of land was transferred with the land allocated under the mahlele.
Laureates of the awupuaas and kuponos were granted the same right of inspection over the resulting bodies of aquatic life as the king. There was no dispute about the right to withdraw and drain off superficial watersheds. Landlords' right to access sea was separable at a cost.
British commons laws on river bank laws were not the Hawaiians. The Hawaii Supreme Court ruling after the ruling had the above mentioned rule of right. So McBryde I came as a shock, violenceful departure from the firmly entrenched jurisprudence, which was completely surprising and unpredictable.
Founded by well agreed statute, the state, civilians and many others in the same category as the plaintiffs dumped millions ofthe dollar in damnations, trenches, pumping facilities, plantations, windmills and ranches to use the shallow wash of Hawaii. A number of the applicants had concluded agreements, others with the State which forced them to use diversionary discharge.
"through the Mahele and the Land Commission Award and the granting of the Royal Patents on Waters was not intentional, could not be, and was not assigned to the laureate, and property in waters in natural courses, brooks and waterways stayed in the population of Hawaii for their mutual benefit.
We therefore note that between the state and McBryde and between McBryde and Gay & Robinson the state is the proprietor of the Koula Stream and Hanapepe River rivers. So there is no "excess water" anymore! G&R's only G&R s left from Gay II are those that belong to the country, built on the tarot cultivated at the times of the Mahel, and G&R can't even divide the two!
So, the courthouse said. Not so merrily emasculating the tenet of the re-s judicious juries, and not at all to the previous authorities of the four cases brought by the McBryde I majoritarian at 178, 504 P.2d 1330; Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948); Universal *584 Const.
Every single case was a "particular situation" in which each tribunal contemplated a departure from the application of the jurisprudence on the ground of "avoidance of obvious injustice" or "fundamental fairness". "In Gay II, the territory, the legal forerunner of the state, has requested a restraining order to prevent G&R from diversion of excess water from the river from the Koula River to the dry areas of Makaweli.
And the real issue was who the excess was. A litigant, a number of the Territorial Supreme Court and the Ninth District Court of Appeal all said that G&R had and possessed ownership of the excess redirected by it. G&R was ordered to redirect these bodies of aquatic life.
This ruling between the same party that decides on the property and the right to diversion of the excess water of the river is binding even on the Supreme Court of Hawaii. McBryde I Supreme Court's debate cannot stop G&R from taking and diversion of these disputed bodies of water, even if the state had the right to all of them!
In Gay II, the applicable and definitive ruling is considered an obstacle to any State' s right to the right to titularise or to branch off the water bodies concerned, irrespective of whether or not the McBryde I Tribunal was right in finding that the State always owns those water bodies.
Hawaii, like any other state, may make changes in its legislation or court of law on immovable properties, which includes legislation regulating the ownership of landowners' interests in and use of water that flows along their territory. Ownership cannot even be confiscated and taken over by the state *585 by law without reimbursing the individual proprietor for his loss of his or her privileges.
Like Justice Stewart in Hughes, super, 389 U.S. at 297, 88 S. Ct. 438, if it is found that the claimants here and not the State held certain mineral waters before McBryde I, then that ruling cannot be acceptable as a coherent testimony of current legislation, unless the ruling in McBryde I could reasonably have been foreseen.
To the uninvited and unanticipated satisfaction of all concerned, the ruling was a present to the state of all bodies of river and river in all creeks, saying that the state had always been in possession of the area. As Dikta, the tribunal had to put the whole body of preliminary rulings to one side, turn its at the time blinkered eye to the starry decisus rupture dogma, break up the tenet of re-suedicata, and find entirely new meaning in equivocal words and rhetoric used a hundred years earlier to amend the laws of hydrographic laws and package the bodies of the state.
This is exactly what McBryde I did; his design and interpretations of the significance of the sentence "promoting and even enforcing the beneficial use of land for the public good" in the principles of 1846, to mean that the king thereby retains ownership of all water, which is then used for farming or household use," he said,
undoubtedly brought about an unpredictable amendment to Hawaii's waterside legislation because the Massachusetts based inspectors encoded the British commons code of the 1850 Acts of the Shore Right, as stated in over 100 years of earlier statements by the Supreme Court of Hawaii.
Through McBryde I, every individual who had been passed to believe that she had clearly defined and well set up aquatic permissions and use of shallow bodies of land found that those aquatic permissions were asserted by the courthouse to be part of the state's publicsector and that the use of any aquatic environment that might be part of any of their shores was only restricted to and on that belongings.
In some cases, the tribunal did not design its case in such a way that it said the claimants had never had such irrigation laws, so, no taking! Though the *586 courthouse may have been motivating to act because the justice thought it was for the best interest of Hawaii that excess waters are possessed in public and that streams, unabated, should be flowing to the seaside, the courthouse could not and cannot take away the plaintiff' personal belongings without having to pay them for it.
The parts of McBryde I and II where the State has all the excess and, under the auspices of the British commons rule on bank privileges, restricts the free diverting of shallow territorial bodies of land for use outside the plaintiffs' country to which they belong must be rendered unsustainable and inadmissible.
Of course, the previous judgment of this tribunal does not interfere with the observations of the Constitutional Tribunal on the associated waters in McBryde I 54 Haw about 189, 504 p.2d 1330. McBryde I. is also not affected by the fact that with 190, 504 P.2d 1330 the courts annulled G&R's right to the associated 90 acre irrigation in Koula and Manuahi.
McBryde's claims for 2,084,600 gallon per gallon per day of regular excess G&R against G&R must continue to be unresolved. McBryde I's most people ('Justice Levinson' included) seemed too preoccupied with the political issues of their opinions to give the issue of regulatory powers the consideration it earned.
The McBryde I argument is puzzling and equivocal. Whilst the Supreme Tribunal had wrongly withdrawn McBryde's "right to prescribe water" from G&R, "if McBryde had prescribed * * * * * water", the real foundation for this operation was that McBryde had withdrawn this amount of public authority drinking mineral oil, against which the regulation could not be applied, it came to the conclusion that the Supreme Tribunal should not have charged G&R "a dual burden" by levying this amount against the G&R aquatic environment.
The McBryde I at 198, 504 p.2d 1330. How this would have doubly burdened G&R is not clear to this tribunal. "Though the question is now academically, since under our holding" that the state owns the bodies of the river "as between McBryde and the state, McBryde did not acquire any normative right to irrigation.
As the Supreme Tribunal felt that the Tribunal was mistaken, it was conditional: "If McBryde had prescribed * * * * * water," concluded the State, it would appear that all the Supreme Tribunal actually considered was that McBryde could not obtain prescription powers against the State. The McBryde had always maintained that his prescription laws were against G&R, that until G&R had fine-tuned and strengthened its offshore bodies of and bypass regimes, sufficient downriver flow to provide both the State and McBryde with their relevant quota of associated and mandatory bodies of aquatic life.
Just Marumoto in McBryde I and Justice Levinson in McBryde II have simply decided that "McBryde's entry points are below the G&R detour point". "McBryde I at 205, 504 p.2d at 1348; McBryde II, 55 haw. at 304, 517 p.2d26.
It appears that neither the overwhelming part of the population nor the minorities looked at the Gay II testimony that G&R has the right to excess water: "As a rule, the plaintiffs in this tribunal shared the view that an excess of excess flowed in the brook in excess of the amount needed to cover the needs of * * * * * lower koleanas and other areas in the Ahupuaaa of Hanapepe which, at the date of the award of the Property Committee on the basis of a decree, were either licensed for the use of or belonged to that area.
587 Thus, Gay II remained available to those who did not take in G&R what they had previously purchased in the area. Previous legislation on the laws on water legislation recognised the same principles. This was the basis of the concept of "normal surplus". Therefore, it would appear that the Utah and Oregon cases quoted by Justice Marumoto are inappropriate in view of well agreed Hawaiian statute that downstream proprietors may earn copyrights through unfair use against an upstream proprietor who will never use them for the whole duration of the citation.
Wong Quai, super ieur, 15 Haw. n. 7, bei 560-62 ; Hutchins, The Hawaiian System of Water Right bei 113-14. Since that tribunal undoubtedly finds the wording and justification of McBryde I and II so equivocal and definitively untenable as it expresses it, that tribunal cannot come to the positive conclusion that it is a matter of the Confederation and therefore, without prejudice to G&R or McBryde's entitlements to regulation powers, will leave the final provision of their entitlements to them to the Fifth District Tribunal meeting as Legal Water Commissioner and exercise the competence which was maintained by the ruling.
It is also necessary to leave the issue of stormy and fresh running and freshwater to the Fifth District Courts as Commissioner for this. Most rescinded the allocation of all surpluses of storms and fresh groundwater by the tribunal and repealed Carter's statement that the state possessed all excess irrigation resources covered by the rules of the state: "The state has the right to use storm-water and fresh water:
"and we' re voting Carter versus Hawaii, 24nhaw." "McBryde I, 54 hawe. at 200, 504 p.2d at 1345. That tribunal, which has broken the foundation for the majority's conclusion, is leaving the question of "storm and fresh water" to the tribunal.
1 ] As used in this ruling, the concepts of the Hwaiian Drinking and Wastewater Act are used in accordance with the use evolved in state rulings over a span of one cent: "The use of the Hwaiian Drinking and Wastewater Act": 1 ) "Appurtenant" means irrigation mainly used for the production of tartar; 2) "Prescriptive" means irrigation privileges obtained through use under the pretext of unfavourable property; 3) "Normal" means excess irrigation beyond what is necessary to satisfy the associated and pre-scriptive irrigation privileges and is in property of the acupua or icupono from which the irrigation has origin; 2) "Prescriptive" means irrigation;
4. "storm and fresh water" means excessive waters intermittent due to storms; 5. The Hanapepe River comprises the Koula and Manuahi brooks connecting to the Hanapepe River. 47, 70-71 (1917); W. Hutchins, The Hawaiian System of Waters Rights, pasim, analyzes all of Hawaii' 1946 rulings (Pl. Ex. 10); report of the Commission of the Territory of Hawaii (Act 36 Legislative of 1915) (Ex. M-Fed. 3, pages.
The Hawaiian Water Authority Bericht "Water Resources in Hawaii", März 1959 (Ex. M-Fed. -4, pp. 63-65) ; Bericht an den House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1983d Congress on the Territorial Irrigation Program in Hawaii par Hawaii Irrigation Authority, Dec. 13, 1954 (Ex. M-Fed. -16, pp. 7 & 8).
In Justice Levinson's disentangled in McBryde II these concepts and the concept "konohiki" are more precisely described. 3 ] The previous cases in Hawaii did not distinguish between the concepts of "related" and "prescriptive" access to public utilities, as there was at first no act on the acquisition of property through unfair use. After that, the word "prescriptive" was used as in No. 1(2) above.
Supreme Courts have the following competences and powers: 1. To consult and decide on all matters of justice or of common law and the fact duly submitted to it by another tribunal * * *. 7 ] This tribunal will therefore review the judgments of Peck against Bailey, 8 Hol.
D-265 (1896); Cross of M. Huwaiian Sugar Co., 12 Hawaii. Waiahole Water Co., 21 Dan. McBryde Sugar Co. of Andrade, 22 Ho. D-578 (1915); Hilo boarding school of Terr. of Hawaii, 23 Ha. Forty-seven ('17); Foster v. Waiahole Water Co., 25 Hill.
A. Day, The Water Commission of the Territory of Hawaii to the Governor (1917), Attorney General C. R. Hemenway (1908), L. Teclaff, oder E. S. S. Handy und E. Handy und E. G. Handy. Handy. Handy.
John Ricord was trained in New York but practised in Louisiana, Texas, Arizona, Florida and Oregon before moving to Hawaii. William L. Lee was borne in New York in 1821, studied at Harvard University and began his legal training in Troy, New York in 1844 after being licensed before the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
In 1848, at the tender of 26, Judge Lee was chosen Supreme Judge of the new Superior Court. In 1849 he was named US Consul to Hawaii and came to Hawaii in 1850. In 1853 he was named Minister of Finance of the Kingdom of Hawaii and in 1857 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, which served as such until 1877.
He was also Hawaii' minister in Washington from 1863 until his abrupt demise on 1 January 1883. 12] Dutton, Meiric K., William K. Lee Hawaii's First Chief Justice & Chancellor of the Kingdom 22. Chief Justice Perry considered the inadequacy and "inappropriateness" of the shore system for the situation in Hawaii in general and Hanapepe in particular; "* * * * * * Our biggest and most productive areas are not shore areas and would not have access to waters and agriculture under this system * * * * Under the Hwaiian system, the waters belonging to each country belong to the country's owners, it was separable and transferrable * * * * ** to other countries * * * * * * Neighbouring or non-northern countries
No restrictions were imposed in favour of land within the same divide or in the same valleys * * * * * *. The portability of groundwater for irrigating Sugarland outside the divide has been recognised in Hawaii since at least 1867, when Chief Justice Allen in Peck v. Bailey, Supra, n. 7th Hobbs, Hawaii A Pageant of the Soil 72-73 (1935) ruled that the transfer of groundwater has been consistent.
"In this case, the problems that have been brought up and heard in the district courts are..... The amount of irrigation that McBryde is eligible for as an annex to its land in the Hanapepe River; (2) the amount of irrigation that the State is eligible for as an annex to its land in the River Koula and Manuahi; (3) the amount of irrigation that other landowners in the River Koula are eligible for as an annex to their land in the Hanapepe River Basin;
The amount of waters McBryde may use under a prescription right; and (5) the right of G&R, the State, McBryde and other landowners in the Vale to the stormy and fresh waters of the Koula Stream and Manuahi Stream. These were also the questions and the only questions submitted to and raised with this tribunal in connection with the present appointment.
" In Gay II, super 7, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the territory's appeal as a right to possession of so-called "surplus water" under the laws of Hawaii, under the King of Hawaii's prerogatives, which were transferred to the United States and transferred to the territory in a fiduciary capacity.
and Manuahi Stream; and (2) G&R's right to redirect this excess to areas outside the Hanapepe River basin. None other than the territory, however, has questioned G&R's title to the ordinary excess of the two creeks.
G&R's right to diversion of such waters from the Hanapepe to areas outside the Hanapepe River was also not undermined. 10 is a long list of aquatic assets McBryde acquired from 1899 to 1962 through the acquisition of the land of Konohiki and Kuleana and separate waters.
Timetable shows that land was sometimes sacrificed to the state or individuals, with reserved waters. 1, Annexes to Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10; In Re Taxes, Waiahole Waters Company, super n. 7; testimony of Richard A. Cox. 17, Annex 1, p. 6; Testimony of Richard A. Cox re Waiahole WaioleWaterSystem.
Wrecked by the Kahana leasehold contract, the demolished sea is duly referred to as ahupuaaa, kohhiki or excess seawater and has never belonged to a particular part of the country and therefore differs from regulatory or shore use. There is this category of irrigation system, which initially the boss or khohiki could have at their discretion, regardless of the permissions of other owner and tenant on or within the ahupua in the prescribed or shore areas.
" Further samples of the government's acquisition of domestic sewage in 1904, 1906 and 1939 are described in M-Fed. 29 ] The Board of Land and Natural Ressources, which is entrusted with the task of drawing up a management blueprint for the design, preservation and optimum use of the country's watersources, is given the authority to condemn the acquisition of waters and bodies of distribution.
30 ] The same conclusion is reached in the report of the Aquatic Commission of the Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1917, pp. 19-20. "Where the primacy of ownership has acquired and is recognised and recognised by national practices, legislation and court rulings, the holders and proprietors of those privileges must remain and be safeguarded in the same; * * * *.
34 ] Although not cited by the Prosecutor General in the State's judgment, the transfer by McBryde I of all of McBryde I's surfacing right to these areas along a brook would not necessarily give the State the right to market such bodies of irrigation for off-water transportation.
The McBryde I gave every Uferland holder "the right to the river's course without significant impairment and in the form and magnitude of it. "McBryde I, 54 Haw. at 198, 504 P.2d at 1344. A further of the hydra-headed issues McBryde I has tackled would be the effect of NEPA on any attempt by the state to divert water surfaces after bank permits have been secured, or even if the state has all plots of land along a canal.
Srunk, 522 F.2d 436, 437 (1975), whereby the appellate tribunal of the ninth district ruled: "Now it is noted that if the right to a constitution is founded on the same alleged injustice as the object of a state lawsuit, and if the political party is equal, it excludes the right to a constitution, regardless of whether it was made before a state tribunal or not, because the state constitution judgement is not only intended to exclude any right that was made before a state tribunal, but also to exclude the invoking of any jurisprudence or any jurisprudence that could have been made in order to provide the requested protection.
Neither side, the state included, could have foreseen what the Supreme Court did, spaonte Soa. of the Supreme Court to allow the applicants to discuss the questions of constitutionality posed by this complaint.